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IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS IN MULTIPLE 
VON WRIGHT’S PREFERENCE LOGIC**1. Introduction
In recent literature D. M. Gabbay was mainly responsible for intro-
ducing, clearly deﬁning, and developing the combining logics concept
(D. M. Gabbay 1995, 1996a, 1996b and 1999 and D. M. Gabbay, M.
Finger 1996), and many subsequent authors then used and applied
it. This fruitful concept, particularly when augmented by the ﬁbring
semantic approach (D. M. Gabbay 1995, 1996a, 1996b and 1999),
provides an application of logical formalism in a widespread scientiﬁc
discipline spectrum. In this case we demonstrate how the combining
logics technique works in the social choice theory context, making it
possible to present and interpret some well known results in a more
approachable and formally pure way.
From the point of view of formal logic, the original Arrow–Sen theory
(K. Arrow 1951 and A. K. Sen 1970b), motivated by social choice
procedures, belongs to higher–order theories — even though it is
deeply mathematically founded and argued — as individuals and
alternatives share the same level in the quantiﬁed formulae (see also
R. Routley 1979).
On the other hand, based on ideas circulated in mathematical eco-
nomics and social choice theory, von Wright was the ﬁrst author to
study the logic of preference as a pure logical concept (G. H. von
Wright 1963 and 1972) based on a slightly extended propositional
language.
The aim of this paper is to present the crucial results of the Arrow–
Sen theory, impossibility theorems, in the context of combined von
Wright’s preference logic, by interpreting the basic Arrow and Sen
axioms as almost pure propositional formulae. This approach, al-
though very formal, provides a simple modiﬁcation and presentation
of impossibility results. In order to attain this goal we introduce
a generalized version of von Wright’s preference logic, obtained by
standard combining techniques (D. M. Gabbay 1999), enabling us to
express simultaneously individual and social preference relations on
the same level.
The paper is organized as follows. In the ﬁrst part we present the
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1951) and A. Sen (A. K. Sen 1970) and their slight transformations.
We then present the basic elements of G. H. von Wright’s original
logic of preference (G. H. von Wright 1963 and 1972). In the se-
quel we develop the formal logical framework precisely, including a
combining von Wright’s systems enabling us to express ﬁnitely many
preference relations simultaneously within one logical system. Due
to the fact that combining technique is applied to Hilbet–type for-
mulations of slight extensions of the classical propositional system,
it is not diﬃcult to justify this process. This framework of com-
bined preference logics will be suﬃcient to demonstrate, in a simple
and approachable way, that, for instance, as indicated in Boriˇ ci´ c
(2012), some modiﬁed forms of impossibility theorems can be ob-
tained. Namely, we isolate the minimal sets of hypotheses, based on
von Wright’s preference logic, under which it is possible to perceive
the spirit of Arrow’s and Sen’s glorious theorems. In order to make
possible a pure formal treatment of axioms, we ’translate’ them into
the language of von Wright’s logic. This operation, for instance,
similarly as in B. Boriˇ ci´ c (2007) and (2009), results in the replace-
ment of one of Arrow’s original non–dictatorship axiom ND by a
ﬁnite number (number of all individuals) of the corresponding non–
dictatorship axioms over the language of von Wright’s logic. One
of Sen’s original liberalism axiom L will also be replaced by a ﬁnite
number of the corresponding almost propositional form of liberalism
axioms.
2. A Description of Arrow–Sen Social Choice Theory
Let V be a set consisting of n individuals. The individuals from V
will be denoted by i,j,... The set of possible alternatives x,y,z,... is
denoted by X. The weak preference relation, a linear and transitive
binary relation, expressing preferences of the person i will be Ri
and the corresponding social weak preference relation, generated by
(R1,...,R n), will be denoted by R. By Pi and P we denote the
strict preference relations (asymmetric, linear and transitive binary
relations) induced by Ri and R, respectively, as follows: Pi = Ri ∩
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i and P = R ∩ R−1. The intended meaning of xPy is ’x is
preferred to y’. The way of deﬁning the social preference relation
R generated by individual preferences (R1,...,R n) is usually called
the social welfare function. The central problem of Arrow’s theory is:
does the social welfare function exist, under the conditions described
below?
By IIA we denote ’the independence of irrelevant alternatives’: for
each Y ⊆ X,
(∀x,y ∈ Y )(∀i ∈ V )(xRiy ↔ xR￿
iy) →
→ (∀x ∈ Y )((∀y ∈ Y )xRy ↔ (∀y ∈ Y )xR￿y)
or, since C(Y,R)={x|x ∈ Y ∧ (∀y ∈ Y )xRy},w eh a v e
(∀x,y ∈ Y )(∀i ∈ V )(xRiy ↔ xR￿
iy) → C(Y,R)=C(Y,R￿)
Also, a general condition U of ’unrestricted domain’, requiring that
the procedure of generating a social preference P can be applied to
any conﬁguration of rational individual preferences Pi, is supposed
to hold.
Two additional basic conditions of Arrow’s theory ’non–dictatorship’
ND and the Pareto rule P, respectively, are usually presented as
follows (K. Arrow 1951, R. Routley 1979, and A. K. Sen 1970b and
1995):
ND ¬(∃i ∈ V )(∀x,y ∈ X)(xPiy → xPy)
P (∀x,y ∈ X)((∀i ∈ V )xPiy → xPy)
The non–dictatorship axiom states that there is no person i, dictator,
having such power that, for each two alternatives x and y, if i prefers
x to y, the society must prefer x to y as well. The Pareto rule says
that, if every individual prefers x to y, then the society must prefer
x to y.
Sen has taken into the consideration ’the liberalism axiom’ L (A. K.
Sen 1970a and 1995):
L (∀i ∈ V )(∃x,y ∈ X)(x ￿= y ∧ (xPiy → xPy) ∧ (yPix → yPx))
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then, for x = y, this axiom would hold universally, for trivial reasons,
because neither condition xPiy, nor yPix would be satisﬁed. The
liberalism condition provides that each individual is decisive over at
least one pair of distinct alternatives.
Let us note that the given axioms are not expressed in the ﬁrst–order
language.
The non–dictatorship and Pareto rules were originally introduced by
K. Arrow, and the liberalism axiom was formally introduced by A.
Sen in the spirit of J. S. Mill’s liberalism comprehension.
In addition, note that Arrow supposed that a social welfare function
is deﬁned for every possible combination of individual preferences,
meaning that it must have a universal domain. Also, the condition
called the independence of irrelevant alternatives is present, ensuring
that ”the way a society ranks a pair of alternative social states x and
y should depend on the individual preferences only over that pair —
in particular, not on how the other (’irrelevant’) alternatives are
ranked” (A. K. Sen 1995). These two conditions have a metalogical
nature. We will use them as general properties of our system.
As a result of applying the abstraction operation to the original
axioms of the Arrow–Sen theory, by ignoring the real nature of the
symbols, we obtain dictatorship D, liberalism L and Pareto rule P,
as the ﬁrst–order predicate language formulae (B. Boriˇ ci´ c 2007 and
2009), respectively, in the following form:
D (∀x,y)(xPiy → xPy), for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
L (∃x,y)(x ￿= y ∧ (xPiy → xPy) ∧ (yPix → yPx)),
for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
P (∀x,y)(
￿
1≤i≤n
xPiy → xPy)
as well as their logical negations, non–dictatorship ND, non–libera-
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ND ¬(∀x,y)(xPiy → xPy), for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
NL (∀x,y)(x = y ∨¬ (xPiy → xPy) ∨¬ (yPix → yPx)),
for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
NP (∃x,y)((
￿
1≤i≤n
xPiy) ∧¬ xPy)
In the sequel, these conditions will be ’translated’ to the analogous
’almost propositional’ formulae.
3. A Sketch of von Wright’s Preference Logic
The logic of preference W(P), as introduced by G. H. von Wright
(G. H. von Wright 1963 and 1972), is a formal theory based on the
propositional language extended by a symbol P for a binary prefer-
ence predicate such that ’APB’ expresses that ’the alternative A is
preferred to the alternative B’, where A and B present propositional
formulae. More formally, the language of W(P) consists of: (a) a de-
numerable set of symbols for propositional letters p,q,r,... (with or
without subscripts), (b) symbols for the Boolean propositional con-
nectives ¬,∧,∨,→ and ↔ (for negation, conjunction, disjunction,
implication and equivalence, respectively), (c) a symbol for a binary
preference predicate P, and (d) parentheses.
The set of alternatives of W(P) is inductively deﬁned as a set of
propositional formulae over propositional letters and propositional
connectives, i.e. the Boolean combinations of propositional letters.
Propositional letters can be understood as metavariables for the el-
ementary alternatives, and we will use capitals A,B,C,..., with or
without subscripts, as metavariables for complex combinations of
elementary alternatives.
Note that in the case of classical two–valued propositional logic, the
set of mutually non–equivalent alternatives built up over the list
of m elementary alternatives (propositional letters) consists of 22
m
elements.
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A and B are alternatives. Formulae of W(P) are the Boolean com-
binations of atomic formulae, i. e. expressions deﬁned inductively
over atomic formulae and the set of propositional connectives. We
also accept the usual conventions regarding the use of parentheses.
The logic of preference W(P) is an extension of the classical propo-
sitional logic2, over the set of formulae deﬁned above, extended by
the following basic axiom—schemata:
(As) APB →¬ (BPA)
(Tr) APB ∧ BPC → APC
(Cnn) APB → APC ∨ CPB
and the following additional axioms deﬁning some special properties
of P:
(w1) APB ↔ (A ∧¬ B)P(¬A ∧ B)
(w2) A ∨ BPC ↔ APC ∧ BPC
(w3) APB ∨ C ↔ APB ∧ APC
(w4) APB ↔ ((A ∧ C)P(B ∧ C)) ∧ ((A ∧¬ C)P(B ∧¬ C))
meaning, for instance, that a conjunctive expansion of preference
P is possible (by (w1)), and that the disjunctive preferences are
’conjunctively distributive’ (by (w2) and (w3)).
It is not diﬃcult to see that, for asymmetry (As), transitivity (Tr),
and connectivity (Cnn), it holds (As),(Cnn) ￿ (Tr), where by ’￿’
we denote the classical deduction relation; but also that (As),(Tr) ￿￿
(Cnn). This is the reason that the transitivity condition could be
omitted from the list of axioms given above. Note that, in this case,
P is an irreﬂexive relation, i.e., for each A, ¬(APA) holds.
A preference relation deﬁned in this way, satisfying axioms (As) and
(Cnn), is usually called a strict preference relation. By means of this
2An interesting alternative approach could be based on some non–
classical propositional logics.
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as follows:
AIB iﬀ(def) ¬(APB) ∧¬ (BPA)
It is provable that I is a reﬂexive, symmetric, and transitive relation,
i.e., I is an equivalence relation. Also, it can be shown that:
APB ∧ BIC ￿ APC
APB ∧ AIC ￿ CPB
A weak preference relation R is usually deﬁned by means of a strict
preference and an indiﬀerence relation in the following way:
ARB iﬀ(def) (APB) ∨ (AIB)
It is provable that R is a linear (consequently, reﬂexive also) and
transitive relation, meaning that R satisﬁes rational choice axioms
(K. Arrow 1951). The following statements are also provable:
APB ∧ BRC ￿ APC
ARB ∧ BPC ￿ APC
4. Combining von Wright’s Preference Logics
In this section we present a construction of combined von Wright’s
preference logics, resulting a natural tool to express some problems
of generating social preference relations by personal relations.
Let W(P) and W(Q) be two logics of preference. By W(P,Q) we de-
note the deductive closure of the union W(P)∪W(Q) of all provable
formulae in W(P) or W(Q), i.e., minimal extension of W(P)∪W(Q)
closed for modus ponens, where P and Q are symbols for the basic
binary preference predicates of W(P) and W(Q), respectively.
Lemma. The logic W(P,Q) is a conservative extension of W(Q).
Proof. We use the induction on the length of proof in W(P,Q). Let
us denote by Γ,∆,... formulae of W(P,Q), and by Γ(P/Q) a formula
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lation symbol P by binary preference relation symbol Q in Γ. For
each axiom Γ of W(P,Q), obviously, Γ(P/Q) is an axiom of W(Q).
Also, bearing in mind that (Γ → ∆)(P/Q) = Γ(P/Q) → ∆(P/Q),
from Γ(P/Q) and (Γ → ∆)(P/Q), we can infer ∆(P/Q) in W(Q),
where, by induction hypothesis, both Γ(P/Q) and (Γ → ∆)(P/Q)
are provable in W(Q). This means that, for each formula Γ, if Γ is
provable in W(P,Q), then Γ is provable in W(Q).
Consequently, W(P,Q) can be considered a regular result of com-
bining W(P) and W(Q).
This process may be extended. We introduce the combined von
Wright’s preference logic, denoted by W(P,P1,...,P n). Let us ex-
tend the language of W(P) by a ﬁnite list of symbols for the bi-
nary preference predicates P1,...,P n, for n ≥ 2. The atomic for-
mulae of W(P,P1,...,P n) are expressions of the form APB and
APiB (1 ≤ i ≤ n), where A and B are alternatives. Formulae of
W(P,P1,...,P n) are the Boolean combinations of atomic formulae.
For instance, the formulae of W(P,P1,...,P n) will appear as follows:
AP1B → BPnC, BPA∨¬(AP1B),... The intended meaning of APiB
that ’the i–th person prefers alternative A to alternative B’, and
APB means that ’the society prefers A to B’.
By combined von Wright’s preference logic we mean a simple deduc-
tive closure of the union of the following von Wright preference logics
W(P) and W(Pi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n), i.e., the set of all consequences of the
union of logics W(P) and W(Pi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n), which is, obviously,
closed for modus ponens.
Based on the Lemma above, by induction on n, we can prove that
W(P,P1,...,P n) is a conservative extension of W(P) and of W(Pi),
for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), meaning that W(P,P1,...,P n) can be treated
as a result of combining W(P), W(P1),..., W(Pn).
5. Some Extensions of the Combined von Wright’s Prefer-
ence Logic
In this part we propose the propositional counterparts of dictatorship
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form:
D: there exists i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), such that, for any A and B,
APiB → APB,
L: for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), there exist two mutually non–equivalent
alternatives A and B, such that
(APiB → APB) ∧ (BPiA → BPA)
P:
￿
1≤i≤n APiB → APB,
as well as their logical negations, non–dictatorship ND, non–libera-
lism NL and non–Pareto rule NP, as follows:
ND : for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), there exist two alternatives A and B
such that
APiB ∧¬ APB
NL : for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and each two mutually non–equivalent
A and B,
(APiB ∧¬ (APB)) ∨ (BPiA ∧¬ (BPA))
NP there exist A and B such that




￿
1≤i≤n
APiB

 ∧¬ APB


These axioms, expressed as formulae of the extended propositional
language on which von Wright’s preference logic is based, enable us
to make a pure formal logical analysis of some relationships between
the conditions under consideration.
Let V = {1,2,...,n} be the set of all individuals. A subset G ⊆ V
will be called a decisive group over the pair of two mutually non–
equivalent alternatives A and B (A. K. Sen 1995), if
(∀i ∈ G)APiB → APB and (∀i ∈ G)BPiA → BPA
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the decisive group. Consequently, the liberalism axiom L may be
formulated as follows: each individual presents a decisive group over
at least one pair of mutually non–equivalent alternatives.
We also want our system W(P,P1,...,P n) to work for each number
of individuals n ≥ 2 and for every possible combination of individ-
ual preferences. This condition corresponds to the universal domain
U. One more condition we want to satisfy is the independence of
irrelevant alternatives IIA, providing that the way a society de-
cides APB, for a pair of alternatives A and B, should depend on
the individual preferences over only that pair, and not on how the
other ’irrelevant’ alternatives are treated by individuals or society.
These two conditions have metatheoretical signiﬁcance with respect
to W(P,P1,...,P n), and both of them can be considered as rules
of process of assigning a social preference relation P to any n–tuple
(P1,...,P n) of individual preferences in the context of combined von
Wright’s preference logic W(P,P1,...,P n).
6. Impossibility Theorems in Combined von Wright’s Pref-
erence Logic
Let us ﬁrst present a propositional counterpart of Sen’s famous result
(A. K. Sen 1970a or 1970b) known as the ’impossibility of Paretian
liberal’ or the ’liberal paradox’:
Theorem. The procedure of assigning a social preference relation to
a ﬁnite number of individual preference relations over a ﬁnite set of
possible alternatives satisfying condition U, based on an asymmetric
and transitive subsystem of combined von Wright’s preference logic,
including axioms L and P, does not exist.
Proof. First we note that an immediate consequence of the asym-
metry axiom is that P is an irreﬂexive relation: ¬(APA). Let us
suppose that the set of all individuals consists of n(≥ 2) persons and
that, for the alternatives A1,...,A n and B1,...,B n, where Ai and
Bi are mutually non–equivalent, the particular cases of liberalism
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AiPiBi → AiPBi
hold, for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), wherefrom we infer
A1PB1 ∧ A2PB2 ∧···∧AnPBn
Now, we analyze the preferences of the ﬁrst two individuals only,
bearing in mind that, for alternatives A1,B 1,A 2 and B2, A1PB1 ∧
A2PB2 holds. In the case when B1 is equivalent to A2 or A1 is
equivalent to B2, it is possible to suppose that B2PiA1, for all i (1 ≤
i ≤ n), or B1PiA2, for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), respectively, from which,
by the Pareto rule, we can infer B2PA1 or B1PA2. So, if B1 ↔ A2,
then, from A1PB1 ∧A2PB2 ∧B2PA1, by (Tr), we conclude A1PA1.
Similarly, if A1 ↔ B2, then, from A1PB1 ∧B1PA2 ∧A2PB2, again,
by (Tr), we conclude A1PA1. Finally, if ¬(B1 ↔ A2)∧¬(A1 ↔ B2),
then it is possible to suppose that, for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), B2PiA1 ∧
B1PiA2, from which, by the Pareto rule, we can infer B2PA1 ∧
B1PA2, and then, from A1PB1 ∧ B1PA2 ∧ A2PB2 ∧ B2PA1, by
(Tr), we conclude A1PA1, violating that P is irreﬂexive, in each
case.
Note that, essentially, the presented proof is in the spirit of Sen’s
original proof (A. K. Sen 1970b or 1995), based on the minimal
liberalism argument, meaning that there are at least two persons
decisive over two existing pairs of distinct alternatives.
A counterpart of Arrow’s general impossibility theorem can be for-
mulated as follows:
Theorem. A procedure of assigning a social preference relation to
a ﬁnite number of individual preference relations over a ﬁnite set
of possible alternatives satisfying conditions U and IIA, based on
an asymmetric and transitive subsystem of combined von Wright’s
preference logic, including axioms ND and P, does not exist.
The basic idea followed here, presented by Sen (A. K. Sen 1995),
in the context of the Arrow–Sen theory, is to divide the proof into
two parts by showing ’the Field–Expansion Lemma’: if a group is
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Contraction Lemma’: if a group is decisive, then so is some smaller
group contained in it.
Proof. Let A, B, C and D be four alternatives, all mutually non–
equivalent, and let G be a decisive group over A and B. Let ∀i(i ∈
G → CPiA ∧ APiB ∧ BPiD) and ∀i(i/ ∈ G → CPiA ∧ BPiD),
which is possible by unrestricted domain. As G is decisive over A
and B, we can conclude APB. On the other hand, by the Pareto
rule, we can infer CPA and BPD. Finally, from CPA, APB, and
BPD, by transitivity, we infer CPD. If this conclusion is inﬂuenced
by individual preferences over any pair other than C and D, then
the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives is violated.
Thus, C must be ranked above D simply by virtue of everyone in G
preferring C to D (since others can have any preference whatsoever
over this pair). Consequently, G is decisive over C and D, meaning
that if a group is decisive over any pair of alternatives, it is decisive.
The proof when the alternatives are not all mutually non–equivalent
is similar. Let G be a decisive group and E and F its partition,
meaning that E and F are non–empty, E ∪ F = G and E ∩ F = ∅.
Let ∀i(i ∈ E → APiB ∧ APiC) and ∀i(i ∈ F → APiB ∧ CPiB).
Now, as by bisection method, we have the two following possibilities:
APC, when E is decisive over A and C; and if E is not decisive over
A and C, then CRA, i.e., C is at least as good as A. As G is decisive
over A and B, and CRA ∧ APB → CPB, we infer CPB. But,
only for members i ∈ F, we have CPiB, meaning that, by the ﬁrst
part of the proof, F is decisive over C and B. Consequently, either
E or F must be a decisive group, which means that if a group (of
more than one person) is decisive, then so is some smaller group
contained within it. Finally, by the Pareto rule, the group of all
individuals is decisive. Since it is ﬁnite, by successive partitioning,
each time picking its decisive part, we arrive at a decisive individual,
a dictator.
Let us now formulate some facts regarding the logical interdepen-
dencies of the axioms under consideration appearing in this context
as well (B. Boriˇ ci´ c 2009 and G. Chichilnisky 1982):
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logic, if D is provable, then P is provable.
Proof. This is the result of a pure formal deduction of P from D, by
weakening the antecedent of the formula APiB → APB n–times.
Consequently, if NP, then ND. This means that each dictatorial
society is Paretian, or, equivalently, that each non–Paretain society
is non–dictatorial.
As an immediate consequence of the previous Lemma and the ’liberal
paradox’, we have:
Corollary. In each asymmetric and transitive subsystem of com-
bined von Wright’s preference logic including axiom U, if L is prov-
able, then ND is provable.
In terms of ’possible’ (consistent) and ’impossible’ (inconsistent)
combinations of axioms of combined von Wright’s preference logic,
we can conclude that if the system containing D is possible, then the
system obtained by substituting D by P is possible; if the system
containing D is possible, then its extension by P is possible; if the
system containing P is impossible, then the system obtained by sub-
stituting P by D is impossible; if the system containing P is impos-
sible, then its extension by D is impossible; if the system containing
NP is possible, then the system obtained by substituting NP by ND
is possible; if the system containing NP is possible, then its exten-
sion by ND is possible; if the system containing ND is impossible,
then the system obtained by substituting NP by ND is impossible;
if the system containing ND is impossible, then its extension by ND
is impossible; the system containing D and NP is impossible (’the
impossibility of a non–Paretian dictator’); the system containing L,
D, and NP is impossible; the system containing NL, D, and NP
is impossible. Consequently, if D is provable, then NL is provable.
This means that each liberal society is non–dictatorial, or, equiv-
alently, that each dictatorial society is non–liberal. It also means
that, under the conditions of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, P and
D are mutually equivalent. This result was obtained by Chichilnisky
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simple and useful examples of interdependence and ’possibility’ and
’impossibility’ results suitable for presentation to students.
7. Concluding Remarks
In contrast to the traditional approach to social choice theory (K.
Arrow 1951 and A. K. Sen 1970b) and preference logic (G. H. von
Wright 1963 and 1972) we propose an interpretation of Arrow’s and
Sen’s impossibility theorems in the context of combined von Wright’s
preference logic. The original Arrow–Sen theory, although based
on principles of preference logic, does not provide the possibility of
constructing complex alternatives, while, on the other hand, von
Wright’s preference logic does not provide the possibility of simulta-
neously expressing individual and social preferences. We believe that
this interpretation, based on the recently introduced and developed
combining logics method (D. M. Gabbay 1999), overcomes these de-
fects and, due to its simplicity in this case, enables us to present
these profound results and ideas to a wider circle of researchers and
readers. Note that we did not use the axioms (w1)–(w4) of W(P) in
the proofs given in part 6 of this paper. This means that it is possi-
ble to prove the presented results in a narrower framework. Namely,
the formulation of the theorems deﬁne the minimal context in which
these famous statements are provable.
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